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Defining Indirect Expropriation: 
The TTIP Approach and the (Elusive) Search for ‘Greater Certainty’ 





The paper assesses the definition of indirect expropriation included in the recent 
EU proposal within the context of the TTIP negotiation. The paper argues that, 
while the EU proposal is likely to have narrowed the scope of the concept of 
indirect expropriation, in terms of providing ‘greater clarity’, we are not there 
yet. Like similar attempts before it, the EU proposal refers to a variety of 
different legal approaches without sufficiently clarifying their content and 
relationship. While this lack of clarity emphasizes the indecision among policy 
makers, including the EU, about where to draw the line between an indirect 
expropriation and a legitimate regulatory measure, it ultimately suggests that 





A provision requiring host States to compensate for the expropriation of foreign 
investments is one of the few constants in the more than three thousand 
international investment treaties concluded in the last sixty years or so. Most of 
these treaties adopt what appears to be a potentially broad definition of 
expropriation expressly referring to both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ expropriations 
and/or ‘measures having an effect equivalent to’ expropriation. While there is 
little controversy in relation to ‘direct expropriation’, investment tribunals have 
interpreted the concept of ‘indirect expropriation’ in different ways. In 
oversimplified terms, arbitral decisions have differed principally in the different 
relevance attributed to the measure’s adverse effect on the foreign investment, 
on the one hand, and the measure’s public policy purpose, on the other.2 
Moreover, there are additional issues that remain disputed with regard to each 
of the two key factors (adverse effect and public policy objective): (a) should the 
adverse effect (or deprivation) on the investment be ‘substantial’ or ‘total’? (b) 
Should tribunals measure the adverse effect with reference to, specifically, the 
investor’s ‘property interests’ in the investment or, more generally, the ‘value’ of 
the investment affected by the host State’s conduct? (c) May any public policy 
                                                        
1 King’s College London; federico.ortino@kcl.ac.uk. The author would like to 
thank Florian Grisel, Jürgen Kurtz, Freya Baetens, Giovanni Bruni and Jorrit 
Rijpma for their very useful comments. 
2 While the initial predominant approach in arbitral practice was based on the 
so-called ‘sole effect’ doctrine (whereby a finding of ‘indirect expropriation’ is 
premised exclusively on an analysis of the substantial adverse impact of the host 
State conduct on the foreign investment), subsequent investment tribunals have 
at times also taken into account the public policy underlying the conduct at issue, 
relying on the so-called ‘police powers’ doctrine. Andrew Newcombe & Lluis 
Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (Kluwer, 2009) at 322 et seq. 
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goal justify a substantial deprivation? (d) Does the review of the legitimacy of the 
host State’s conduct entail a reasonableness or proportionality analysis?3 
 
While in practical terms, it may be argued that there are nowadays more 
important treaty provisions protecting foreign investment (particularly the fair 
and equitable treatment clause),4 the controversy over the proper definition of 
indirect expropriation still highlights the broader debate over the appropriate 
restraints imposed by international investment treaties on States’ regulatory 
authority for purposes of promoting the flow of foreign investment and thus the 
prosperity of the treaty’s contracting parties. The essence of this debate is 
captured by the discussion within the European Union (EU) on the shape of 
future EU investment agreements,5 particularly in the context of the negotiation 
of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU 
and the United States. The two contracting parties have recognized two key 
challenges. The first challenge is to find the right balance between granting ‘the 
highest possible level of protection’ to foreign investors and safeguarding States’ 
ability ‘to adopt and maintain measures necessary to regulate in the public 
interest to pursue certain public policies’.6 The second challenge is to improve 
the clarity and predictability of investment treaties principally (a) to allow host 
States and investors to appreciate (and comply with) the rules applicable to their 
relationship and (b) to decrease the high level of discretion currently entrusted 
on to ad hoc investment tribunals to decide the legitimacy of public interest 
regulations.7 
 
The aim of the paper is to critically assess the definition of indirect expropriation 
included in the recent EU Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of 
Investment Disputes8 and determine whether the two mentioned challenges 
have been sufficiently addressed by such proposal. 
 
The EU Proposal on expropriation is part of a wider trend recently followed by 
policy makers with the aim of introducing greater clarity with regard to the 
                                                        
3 See Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties (CUP, 
2014) at 255. 
4 Michael Reisman and Rocio Digon “Eclipse of Expropriation” in Arthur Rovine 
(ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation – The 
Fordham Papers 2008 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) at 27 et seq. 
5 See August Reinisch, The Future Shape of EU Investment Agreements, 28 ICSID 
Review 179 (2013). 
6 See the 2012 Statement on Shared Principles for International Investment by the 
European Union (EU) and the United States.  
7 See also European Parliament Resolution on the Future of the European 
International Investment policy (6 April 2011) 2010/2203(INI), para 24. 
8 See European Union's proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of 
Investment Disputes tabled for discussion with the United States and made 
public on 12 November 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf 
(accessed 23 June 2016) [hereinafter EU Proposal]. 
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concept of indirect expropriation directly in the text of investment treaties.9 The 
paper’s focus on the EU Proposal, in particular, stems from the perception that 
the recent entry of the EU (and consequently the European Commission) in the 
global policy debate on international investment law represents a game changer. 
First, the EU is one of the powerhouses when it comes to international economic 
relations and thus it has the ability to influence (if not impose) its choices on to 
most other economic partners. Second, the EU is now exclusively competent 
when it comes to foreign direct investment and has embarked on an ambitious 
negotiating trade and investment agenda with several major economies (such as 
Canada, India, Vietnam, Singapore, China, United States) with the particular aim 
to eventually replace the more than 1000 investment treaties signed in the past 
by EU Members States. Third, the EU is a very diverse entity including, for 
example, in its membership historically capital exporting (such as Germany, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom) and capital importing countries (such as the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) with different experiences and perceptions 
when it comes to international investment law and arbitration.10 In short, there 
is little doubt that the EU will play a pivotal role in shaping the evolution of the 
international investment law regime and thus there exist a particularly high level 
of expectations (and trepidations) over what the EU will do in this field. 
 
The paper argues that, while the EU Proposal is likely to have narrowed the 
scope of the concept of indirect expropriation, in terms of providing ‘greater 
clarity’, we are not there yet. Like similar attempts before it, the EU Proposal 
refers more or less expressly to a variety of legal approaches without sufficiently 
clarifying their content and relationship. While this lack of clarity clearly 
emphasizes the indecision among policy makers, including the EU, about where 
to draw the line between an indirect expropriation (that entails compensation) 
and a legitimate regulatory measure (that does not), it ultimately also suggests 
that there are still doubts about what should be the proper function of 
international investment law.  
 
Mirroring the relevant text of the EU Proposal, the paper is divided in four main 
sections or ‘acts’. In Act I, the paper first addresses the main provision on 
expropriation found in Article 5 of the proposed text (section 2). In the three 
subsequent acts, the paper examines in order each of the three paragraphs of the 
Annex on Expropriation (sections 3, 4 and 5). The paper employs the theatrical 
metaphor to highlight the existence of an overall plot and at the same time the 
specificity of each individual part. 
 
2 ACT I: ARTICLE 5 AND THE CONTINUITY WITH PAST TREATY PRACTICE 
 
Article 5 of the 2015 EU Proposal embodies the relevant provisions on 
expropriation. Paragraph 1 of Article 5 reads as follows: ‘Neither Party shall 
nationalize or expropriate a covered investment either directly or indirectly 
                                                        
9 See UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note: Taking Stock of IIA Reform (2 March 2016) at 8-9. 
10 See Federico Ortino and Piet Eeckhout, Towards an EU Policy on Foreign Direct 
Investment’ in Andrea Biondi et al (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford, OUP 2012) 
at 321-2. 
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through measures having an effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation’. 
 
The immediate reaction to Article 5 on Expropriation is that there is no change 
compared with the text of expropriation provisions of many existing investment 
treaties. However, Article 5.2 adds the following language: ‘For greater certainty, 
this paragraph shall be interpreted in accordance with Annex I [on 
expropriation]’. 
 
As the reader will surely know, this is not a novel strategy. The United States 
(and Canada) appear to have been the first to introduce a similar approach in 
their 2004 model bilateral investment treaties (and subsequently in their 
investment treaty practice). While it is beyond the scope of this contribution to 
examine the specific reasons behind those changes,11 it is fair to say that a key 
part of their strategy was to bring about clarity particularly with regard to the 
notion of ‘indirect expropriation’. More importantly, clarifying the notion of 
indirect expropriation through an annex appended to the new (model) treaty has 
one key advantage: it strengthens the continuity with past treaty practice. At 
least in terms of the basic provision on expropriation, the new approach does not 
involve any major re-elaboration of the very notion of expropriation, which still 
refers to both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ forms linking the latter concept with the 
phrase ‘measures having an effect equivalent’. More fundamentally, the approach 
based on keeping the original language in the basic provision on expropriation 
but adding a clarification in an annex to the treaty may have the additional effect 
of influencing how investment tribunals would interpret existing investment 
treaties, which do not include such an annex.12  
 
There are however, also risks with an approach based on preserving continuity 
with past treaty practice. First, relying on the traditional wording at least for 
purposes of the basic provision on expropriation has the potential risk of 
maintaining the traditional level of uncertainty with regard to the very concept 
of indirect expropriation. Second, and more fundamentally, relying on the 
traditional wording may preserve the (more or less apparent) treaty’s emphasis 
on affording a high level of protection to foreign investment to the detriment of 
the host State’s regulatory sovereignty. In other words, mere reference to the 
measure’s ‘effect’ on the investment may lead (at least some) tribunals to 
continue to focus on the measure’s substantial adverse effect on the investment 
notwithstanding the legitimacy and reasonableness of the public policy being 
pursued by the host State. In many ways, whether these risks will actually 
                                                        
11 For a detailed discussion of the 2004 and 2012 US model treaties see Andrea 
Menaker, Benefitting from Experience: Developments in the United States’ Most 
Recent Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 121 (2005) and Lee 
Caplan and Jeremy Sharpe, United States in Chester Brown (ed), Commentaries on 
Selected Model Investment Treaties (Oxford, OUP 2013) at 755 et seq., 
respectively. 
12 The decision of the tribunal in Methanex v United States (Award, 7 August 
2005) may provide the best evidence for such additional impact. 
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materialise will principally depend on the very content of the clarification 
included in the relevant Annex. Let us now turn to it. 
 
3 ACT II: THE ANNEX ON EXPROPRIATION AND THE MEANING OF 
‘MEASURES WITH AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO DIRECT EXPROPRIATION’ 
 
In addition to defining the notion of ‘direct expropriation’, the opening 
paragraph of the Annex reiterates the relevance of the ‘effect’ of the measure 
under review for purposes of defining ‘indirect expropriation by stating that 
‘indirect expropriation occurs where a measure or series of measures by a Party 
has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation’. The first paragraph, however, 
goes further (than any other existing treaties) specifying that a measure (or 
series of measures) has such effect if ‘it substantially deprives the investor of the 
fundamental attributes of property in its investment, including the right to use, 
enjoy and dispose of its investment, without formal transfer of title or outright 
seizure’. Let us focus on the following two key issues: the ‘quantum’ of 
deprivation (‘substantial’) and the ‘object’ of deprivation (‘fundamental 
attributes of property’). 
 
‘Substantial deprivation’ is a well-known phrase in investment arbitral practice 
and has been often referred to by tribunals interpreting indirect expropriation 
based on either the ‘sole effect’ or ‘police powers’ doctrines. It appears however, 
to be the first time that such phrase has been codified in the (draft) text of an 
investment treaty (as neither the US nor the Canadian model treaties refer to it) 
in connection with the notion of ‘measures with an effect equivalent to direct 
expropriation’.  
 
In one sense, the codification settles the debate surrounding the required 
magnitude of the deprivation. While most tribunals set the bar just below ‘total’ 
deprivation,13 some investment tribunals appear to have adopted an approach 
requiring a higher level of deprivation. For example, for purposes of defining a 
measure equivalent to expropriation, the tribunal in Venezuela Holdings v 
Venezuela stated that ‘deprivation requires either a total loss of the investment's 
value or a total loss of control by the investor of its investment, both of a 
permanent nature.’14 
 
In another sense, however, codifying the concept of ‘substantial deprivation’ may 
not have brought much clarity in the test for indirect expropriation. Tribunals 
have indeed resisted providing clear guidance on the level of interference that is 
required to establish ‘substantial deprivation’, emphasising the ‘fact-sensitive’ 
nature of the assessment.15 
 
                                                        
13 Metalclad v Mexico, Award, 30 August 2000, para. 103. 
14 Venezuela Holdings BV, Mobil Cerro Negro Holding LTD et al v Venezuela, 
Award, 9 October 2014, para. 286. See also Tecmed v Mexico, Award, 29 May 
2003, para. 115 and Cargill v Mexico, Award, 18 September 2009, para. 360 
(referring to ‘radical’ deprivation). 
15 Chemtura v Canada, Award, 2 August 2010, para. 249. 
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Moreover, the reference to ‘substantial deprivation’ does not seem to settle the 
so called ‘denominator’ problem: in order to determine whether the host State 
has caused ‘substantial’ deprivation of the investment a tribunal needs first to 
identify the (contours of the) investment itself. 16  In investment treaty 
arbitration, the issue of ‘partial’ expropriation is indeed a controversial one as 
some tribunals have expressly denied the very concept of partial expropriation 
and other tribunals have expressly recognized it.17 
 
Contrary to the concept of ‘substantial deprivation’, the phrase ‘fundamental 
attributes of property’ is not one that investment tribunals have used in 
addressing expropriation claims. The closest I have come across something 
similar at the international level is in Tippets, where the Iran-US Tribunal stated 
that a taking of property includes the case where “the owner was deprived of 
fundamental rights of ownership”. 18  It may also be linked with notions 
developed within North American or European domestic legal systems. For 
example, some French scholars identify the right to use, benefit and dispose of 
the property as the three ‘attributs du droit de propriété’ (to be distinguished 
from the ‘caractères du droit de propriété’, ie., that the right is absolute, exclusive 
and perpetual).19 
 
The key issue here is identifying the ‘object’ of the deprivation. In the absence of 
any textual reference, investment tribunals have focused on a variety of aspects 
including the deprivation of the control, use, benefit, enjoyment, value of the 
investment. For example, the Metalclad tribunal referred to deprivation ‘of the 
use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property’.20 The Tecmed v 
Mexico tribunal referred first to the deprivation ‘of the economical use and 
enjoyment of [the claimant’s] investments, as if the rights related thereto—such 
as the income or benefits related to the Landfill or to its exploitation—had 
ceased to exist’; it then specified that the relevant inquiry focused on whether 
‘the assets involved have lost their value or economic use for their holder and the 
extent of the loss.’21 The Chemtura tribunal referred to deprivation of ‘the benefit 
                                                        
16  Alessandra Asteriti, Regulatory Expropriation Claims in International 
Investment Arbitrations: A Bridge Too Far? in Andrea Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook of 
International Investment Law and Policy (2012-13) at 462. 
17 See Ursula Kriebaum, Partial Expropriation, 8 JWIT 69 (2007). 
18 Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 22 June 1984, 6 Iran-US CTR 219, 225. See also the 
reference to “fundamental right of ownership” in Mezzanine v Hungary, Award, 
17 April 2015, para. 178. 
19 Pierre Voirin and Gilles Goubeaux, Doit Civil – Tome 1 (Paris, L.G.D.J. 2013) 255 
et seq. See also the request to the Constitutional Council relating to its Decision 
85-189 DC, 17 July 1985, where the right to dispose is referred to as an ‘attribut 
fundamental’, ‘attribut essentiel’, and ‘attribut capital’ of property. [I am indebted 
to Dr Florian Grisel for this reference]. See also the reference to the concept of 
‘fundamental attributes of property ownership’ in US takings law such as in 
Guimont v. Clarke 121 Wn.2d 586 (1993) 854 P.2d 1. 
20 Metalclad, supra at ?, para. 103. 
21 Tecmed, supra at ?, para. 115. 
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of’ the claimant’s investment.22 The tribunal in Glamis referred to impairment of 
‘the investor’s economic rights, ie., ownership, use, enjoyment or management of 
the business’ as well as to deprivation of the ‘economic value’ of the claimant’s 
investment.23 The tribunal in Venezuela Holdings v Venezuela equated the 
required deprivation to either a total loss of the investment's value or a total loss 
of control by the investor of its investment’.24 
 
Tribunals tend to list several of the factors mentioned above (e.g., control, use, 
benefit, enjoyment, value) but they chose different combinations. More 
problematically, it is not altogether clear whether each factor is individually 
sufficient in order to establish an expropriation or whether they are cumulative 
requirements. In selecting the relevant factors, tribunals use unfortunately 
different conjunctions (‘and’ or ‘or’). It is clear, however, that each individual 
factor has its own specific meaning and thus applying one factor over another 
one may, depending on the circumstances of the case, lead to different results. 
For example, there may be cases where the host State’s measure under review 
has (substantially) deprived the investor of its control over the investment 
without having (at least substantially) deprived the investment of its value and 
vice versa. 
 
It is not clear whether the language chosen in the Annex on Expropriation 
proposed by the EU, referring to deprivation of ‘the fundamental attributes of 
property’ codifies (at least in part) existing investment arbitral practice or 
whether it purports to introduce a novel concept. The Annex does specify that 
‘the right to use, enjoy and dispose of its investment’ are examples of such 
fundamental attributes. As the list appears to be indicative, it is not clear 
whether there exist any other fundamental attributes of property beyond the 
three expressly mentioned. For example, is the investor’s right to the ‘value’ of its 
investment a fundamental attribute of property? And, even if that were not the 
case, could an investor claim that a substantial reduction of the value of its 
investment (due to the host State’s conduct) is enough to demonstrate a 
‘substantial deprivation’ of its right to use or enjoy or even dispose of its 
investment? Would a tribunal require a stronger link between the host State’s 
conduct and the fundamental attribute of property being affected? Take the 
example of a minority shareholding in a locally incorporated company being the 
relevant protected investment. The foreign investor claims that the host State’s 
conduct has revoked the local company’s necessary license to operate its 
business and thus negatively affected the value of the claimant’s shareholding in 
the local company. While the revocation of the license did not directly interfere 
with any of the fundamental property attributes of the protected investment 
(shareholders’ rights to appoint directors, or receive dividends, formally still 
exist), one may argue that the revocation did have an indirect impact on the 
fundamental attributes of property: without the license, the local company 
cannot operate and thus the right to use, enjoy and dispose of the shareholding 
have for all practical purposes being deprived. 
                                                        
22 Chemtura v Canada, Award, 2 August 2010, para 247. 
23 Glamis Gold v United States, Award, 8 June 2009, paras 357-58. 
24 Venezuela Holdings, supra n. ?, para. 286. 
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In conclusion, while paragraph 1 of the Annex emphasizes the relevance of the 
‘effect’ of the measure under review for purposes of defining the notion of 
‘indirect expropriation’ (in line with the sole-effect doctrine), uncertainty 
remains with regard to both the ‘quantum’ and the ‘object’ of the necessary 
deprivation. 
 
4 ACT III: THE ANNEX AND THE ‘CASE-BY-CASE INQUIRY’ 
 
In paragraph 2, the Annex changes tack and links the determination of an 
indirect expropriation to a ‘case-by-case inquiry’ based on a variety of factors 
including principally the ‘economic impact’ and ‘object and content’ of the 
measure. Paragraph 2 of the Annex states as follows:  
 
The determination of whether a measure or series of measures by a Party, 
in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a 
case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
(a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, 
although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a 
Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred; 
(b) the duration of the measure or series of measures by a Party; 
(c) the character of the measure or series of measures, notably their 
object and content. 
 
The language is very similar (but by no means identical) to that found in the 
parallel Annex on expropriation put forward for the first time by the United 
States in its 2004 model investment treaty. The US approach is, in turn, a 
codification of the case-by-case test enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Penn Central Transport Co. v New York City,25 which constitutes one of 
the key components of US constitutional law on regulatory taking (the so-called 
Penn Central test).26 
 
If the first paragraph of the Annex reiterates the continued validity of the sole 
effect doctrine for purposes of determining an indirect expropriation, the second 
paragraph appears to embrace an approach based on a broader inquiry that 
includes both the impact and character of the measure under review. The latter 
approach is thus closer to the approach adopted by those investment tribunals 
that have referred to the host State’s police powers as one of the relevant factors 
in establishing indirect expropriation. 
 
                                                        
25 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
26 See Parvan Parvanov & Mark Kantor, Comparing US Law and Recent US 
Investment Agreements: Much More Similar than you Would Expect, in Andrea 
Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2010-2011 
(OUP, 2012) at 767. 
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Thus, the first key question that confronts the reader revolves around the 
relationship between the two (apparently conflicting) criteria identified in the 
first two paragraphs of the Annex in order to determine an ‘indirect 
expropriation’ (‘substantial deprivation of the fundamental attributes of 
property’ v ‘case-by-case inquiry’). As the Annex does not provide any clue on 
the nature of the relationship, several options are available. A first option is a 
‘rule v exception’ relation, whereby substantial deprivation will lead to a finding 
of indirect expropriation unless the outcome of the case-by-case inquiry shows 
the strength of the public policy aim being pursued by the measure under 
review.27 A second option is a ‘threshold v norm’ relation, whereby substantial 
deprivation only represents a necessary preliminary threshold test that the 
claimant has to overcome before the case-by-case inquiry is performed in order 
to determine whether the host State’s measure constitutes an indirect 
expropriation.28 While these first two options are relatively similar, they differ in 
the relevance attributed to each element: the emphasis in the first option is on 
the ‘substantial effect’, while the emphasis in the second option is on the case-by-
case analysis. A third option is a ‘per se taking v rule of reason’ relation, whereby 
cases of ‘substantial deprivation’ will automatically lead to a finding of indirect 
expropriation, while other cases involving lesser forms of deprivation, are 
subject to the case-by-case analysis based on a variety of factors.29 A fourth 
option is to subsume ‘substantial deprivation’ into the ‘case-by-case analysis’, 
which includes, after all, taking into account the ‘economic impact of the 
measure’.30 
 
A second related question deals with the very nature of the case-by-case inquiry 
put forward in the second paragraph of the Annex. First, the list of relevant 
factors is merely indicative, thus there may be additional factors to be taken into 
account. For example, in the US constitutional jurisprudence as well as in US 
treaties concluded based on the 2004 model, one of the key factors, which is not 
included in the EU Proposal, is ‘the extent to which the government action 
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations’.31 The three 
factors listed – the economic impact, duration and character of the measure – 
may need some fleshing out. For example, is the reference to the measure’s 
‘economic impact’ meant to be to the measure’s impact on the specific 
investment or does it include a broader assessment? It is not clear whether the 
language expressly noting that ‘the sole fact that a measure […] has an adverse 
effect on the economic value of an investment does not establish that an indirect 
                                                        
27 See Chemtura v Canada, supra n. ?. 
28 See Glamis Gold, supra n. ?, para. 357. 
29 This option reflects US law on regulatory taking as shown in Parvanov & 
Kantor, supra n. ?, at 767. 
30 This appears to be the approach adopted by the tribunal in Railroad 
Development Corporation v. Guatemala, Award, 29 June 2012. See Asteriti, supra 
n. ?, at 464. 
31  This additional factor is included in the most recent version of the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and 
the EU (see Annex 8-A on Expropriation). Text was released to the public for 
information purposes on 29 February 2016. 
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expropriation has occurred’ provides a definitive answer one way or the other to 
this question.32 
 
More fundamentally, it is not clear what kind of case-by-case inquiry a future 
tribunal will perform based on the language of paragraph 2 of the Annex. Such 
language may entail a variety of tests involving different levels of intrusiveness 
in the regulatory prerogatives of States.33 At the lower end of the intrusiveness 
spectrum, the case-by-case approach may simply require the existence of a 
rational connection between the means used and the governmental objective 
sought to be achieved (ie., the conduct adopted is likely to achieve at least in part 
the legitimate policy aim). This option does not appear likely as the means-end 
test does not focus on the economic impact of the measure but rather on the 
extent to which the measure contributes to the chosen policy goal. 
 
A more plausible option is to read the case-by-case inquiry as requiring that the 
conduct chosen by the host State entails the lowest possible burden to achieve 
the specific policy goal (ie., the conduct adopted is the most cost-effective in 
achieving the legitimate policy aim). A cost-effectiveness test does need to 
consider both the adverse impact on the investment and the ability of one or 
more measures to achieve the chosen policy objective. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, and equally plausible, the case-by-case 
approach in paragraph 2 may entail a strict balancing between the costs imposed 
on the investor’s property and the benefits of the public regulatory action. Under 
this test, the tribunal will need to determine whether the measure’s impact on 
the investor is proportional to the legitimate policy aim. 
 
These three distinct tests are neatly captured by the three prongs – ‘suitability’, 
‘necessity’ and ‘strict proportionality’ – of the principle of proportionality, which 
finds its modern origin in German public law and its application in various 
domestic, regional and international legal systems.34 
 
Lastly, paragraph 2 is also not clear with regard to the intensity of the review to 
be carried out by an investment tribunal. Should the tribunal subject the public 
                                                        
32 The statement does provide a strong indication that an assessment of whether 
a measure has had a ‘substantial deprivation’ for purposes of paragraph 1 of the 
Annex should not be based, at least exclusively, on the measure’s impact on the 
‘value’ of the investment. 
33 For example, US constitutional jurisprudence on regulatory takings has not 
simply evolved over the years, but it is marred by uncertainty and vagueness. 
David Schneiderman Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment 
Rules and Democracy’s Promise (CUP, 2008) at 48 et seq. 
34 Among the vast scholarship on the topic see Jurgen Schwarze, European 
Administrative Law (Luxemburg, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992); Mads Andenas & 
Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law in Comparative Perspective, 42 Tex. 
Int’l L.J. 371 (2007); Aaron Barak, Proportionality and Principled Balancing, 3 
Law & Ethics of Human Rights 1 (2010). See recently Caroline Henckels, 
Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration (CUP, 2015). 
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policy action at issue to an intense review or should it grant the respondent host 
State a so-called ‘margin of appreciation’? While there may be other elements in 
the investment chapter that may provide important clues on such question (for 
example, the express recognition of the contracting parties’ right to regulate), the 
intensity of the review represents another important (and unclear) variable in 
the determination of what constitutes indirect expropriation. 
 
In conclusion, paragraph 2 fails to clarify the nature of the case-by-case inquiry 
introduced therein as well as the relationship between the ‘case-by-case inquiry’ 
and the effect-based test put forward in paragraph 1. 
 
5 ACT IV: THE ANNEX AND THE RIGHT TO REGULATE CLARIFICATION 
 
The final act of the EU Proposal’s attempts to provide a clearer definition of 
indirect expropriation is embodied in the third and final paragraph of the Annex 
on Expropriation. Paragraph 3 states as follows: 
 
For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the impact of a 
measure or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it 
appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate policy objectives, such as the 
protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals, social or 
consumer protection or promotion and protection of cultural diversity do not 
constitute indirect expropriations.  
 
This paragraph appears to incorporate the concept of the right to regulate in the 
public interest (or ‘police powers’). It introduces a general principle according to 
which non-discriminatory measures designed and applied to protect legitimate 
policy objectives do not constitute indirect expropriations except in the rare 
circumstance when the impact of the measure is so severe in light of its purpose 
that is appears manifestly excessive. 
 
The most effective interpretation of the third paragraph of the Annex is to read it 
as establishing a presumption in the context of the case-by-case analysis under 
the second paragraph according to which non-discriminatory measures for a 
public purpose do not constitute indirect expropriation. It is a rebuttable 
presumption as even such measures may constitute indirect expropriation in the 
exceptional case of a measure that imposes such manifestly excessive burdens 
(on the investment?) compared to the measure’s public policy benefits. 
 
It is not clear, however, whether the case-by-case analysis described in 
paragraph 2 would then only be applicable for purposes of determining the 
exceptional case (according to a cost/benefit balancing test) or more broadly in 
order to assess whether a measure falls under the general presumption (i.e., it is 
a non-discriminatory measure designed and applied to protect a legitimate 
public policy). 
 
A second related issue regarding the right to regulate clarification revolves 
around the issue of determining when a non-discriminatory measure may be 
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said to be ‘designed and applied’ to protect a legitimate public policy. What is the 
applicable test to determine whether a specific host State conduct qualifies for 
the presumption in paragraph 3? Once again, there exist several options 
including good faith, reasonableness, necessity and even cost/benefit balancing. 
First, it may be enough that the measure at issue be a good faith attempt at 
addressing a legitimate public policy concern. In international investment law, 
for example, this test is often linked with the prohibition of arbitrariness (at least 
in customary international law)35 and with so-called self-judging clauses.36  
 
Second, the language chosen in paragraph 3 may entail an assessment of 
whether the measure at issue is reasonably linked with a legitimate public policy 
aim pursued by the host State. The test of reasonableness focuses on ‘a sufficient 
causal link between the legitimate objective sought and the behaviour that one 
seeks to establish as reasonable’.37 
 
Third, paragraph 3 may be interpreted as requiring the more demanding 
‘necessity’ or ‘least restrictive alternative’ test, whereby the non-discriminatory 
measure chosen by the host State entails the lowest possible burden to achieve 
the specific policy goal. In this context, the interpreter could rely on the express 
recognition of the contracting parties’ right to regulate “through measures 
necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives” included in Article 2.1 of the 
proposed Investment Chapter. However, the reference to ‘necessary’ in the 
context of the general provision on the right to regulate, but not in the right to 
regulate presumption in the Annex on expropriation may not prove conclusive 
either way. On one hand, it could be argued that the right to regulate 
presumption in the Annex should be read in line with the general provision on 
the right to regulate in Article 2, thus requiring the application of the necessity 
test in order for the right to regulate presumption to apply. On the other hand, 
one could also argue that the omission of the term ‘necessary’ in the Annex is 
evidence of the contracting parties’ willingness to set a lower threshold for 
purposes of the application of the right to regulate presumption. 
 
Lastly, the applicable test to determine whether a specific host State conduct 
qualifies for the presumption in paragraph 3 of the Annex may involve 
cost/benefit balancing. This reading may be supported specifically if one reads 
the case-by-case analysis described in paragraph 2 of the Annex as involving 
such balancing. Furthermore, the apparent reference to cost/benefit balancing as 
the basis for reversing the right to regulate presumption (albeit a case involving 
a ‘manifestly excessive’ lack of balance) may also support the argument pointing 
to cost/benefit balancing as constituting the applicable test for purposes of 
                                                        
35 See Patrick Dumberry, The Prohibition against Arbitrary Conduct and the Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Standard under NAFTA Article 1105, 15 JWIT 117 
(2014). 
36 See Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, ‘If the State Considers’: Self-Judging Clauses 
in International Dispute Settlement, in A von Bogdandy & R Wolfrum (eds) 13 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Brill, 2009) 61-140. 
37 Olivier Corten, The notion of ‘reasonable’ in international law: legal discourse, 
reason and contradictions, 48 ICLQ 613, 623 (1999). 
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establishing the applicability of the right to regulate presumption, in the first 
place. 
 
Accordingly, while the aim of paragraph 3 is clearly to introduce a mechanism to 
safeguard host States’ right to regulate in the public interest, the scope and 
operation of such mechanism remain unclear. 
 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
There is no doubt that the underlying aim of the EU Proposal on indirect 
expropriation is praiseworthy. Greater clarity with regard to the investment 
protection standards established in international treaties reduces some of the 
legal controversies that have recently inflamed foreign investor-host State 
relations, involved high arbitration costs and undermined the overall legitimacy 
of the international investment regime. 
 
However, the paper has tried to show that the attempt to instil ‘greater certainty’ 
in the notion of indirect expropriation undertaken by the EU in its recent TTIP 
proposal (as well as by many other countries in other treaty contexts) risks to 
prove unsuccessful. The Annex refers more or less expressly to a variety of legal 
approaches without clarifying their contour and relationship. 
 
Accordingly, Article 5 and the first paragraph of the Annex refers to the 
measure’s ‘effect’ and the concept of ‘substantial deprivation’, very much along 
the lines of the so called ‘sole-effect’ doctrine developed by investment tribunals. 
The second paragraph of the Annex refers to a case-by-case inquiry involving a 
broader set of relevant factors including principally the measure’s economic 
impact and character and seems to rely on some kind of balancing exercise 
aimed at determining the existence of an indirect expropriation. Finally, the third 
paragraph of the Annex refers to the right to regulate and appears to establish 
the presumption that non-discriminatory measures designed and applied for a 
legitimate public purpose do not constitute an indirect expropriation except in 
the rare case where such measure imposes manifestly excessive burdens on the 
investment compared to the measure’s public policy benefits. There is very little 
or no indications on how the three approaches interact with one another and 
thus operate in practice. 
 
Moreover, the contours of each approach remains in some important respects 
unclear. For example, the reference to the substantial deprivation of the 
‘fundamental attributes of property’ remains largely unexplored. For example, 
will the deprivation inquiry focus on ‘rights’ or on ‘value’? The type of balancing 
exercise that should be carried out in the case-by-case inquiry is also not 
specified. Will a tribunal need to apply a cost-effectiveness (necessity) test or a 
cost/benefit (proportionality in the strict sense) test? Equally, the applicable test 
to determine whether a specific host State conduct qualifies for the right to 
regulate presumption may be based on various legal concepts such as good faith, 
reasonableness, necessity and cost/benefit balancing. 
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Of course, legal certainty is a relative concept and it would be illusory to expect 
absolute clarity in the regulation of expropriation (particularly at the 
international level). However, many of the issues that have not been settled in 
the EU Proposal (as in many other recent investment treaties) are issues too 
central to remain unresolved. Is indirect expropriation about substantial adverse 
effect on the investment or is it about the legitimacy and reasonableness of the 
public policy measure adopted by the host State? Should the right to regulate be 
subject to a test based on good faith, necessity, or strict cost/benefit balancing? If 
the underlying purpose, in addition to bringing about greater certainty, is to 
strike the right balance between affording a high level of protection to foreign 
investment and safeguarding the host State’s right to regulate in the public 
interest, these questions must be tackled head-on and clearly resolved.  
 
One may argue that the lack of clarity may be due to the specific strategy 
employed by the EU (and many other countries before it), which tries to find 
inspiration from past tribunals’ practice. Any attempt to codify a doctrine that 
has developed through a long and complex jurisprudence (such as that of the US 
Supreme Court or of hundreds of ad hoc investment tribunals) is in itself a 
herculean feat full of risks and pitfalls. However, I believe the missing piece in 
the puzzle is a different one. Policy makers, including the EU, have crucially not 
yet figured out the appropriate balance between investment protection and 
States’ right to regulate. While they have understood the relevant stakes in the 
debate, they have not yet been able to draw the line between an indirect 
expropriation (that entails compensation) and a legitimate regulatory measure 
(that does not). Ultimately, this is because policy makers have not decided what 
is the main function of investment treaties: is it to protect foreign investments or 
to subject host countries to certain principles of good public governance? The 
admittedly imperfect attempt at bringing about greater clarity to the concept of 
indirect expropriation through the Annex on expropriation is the perfect 
evidence of this indecision. 
 
In principle, many options are potentially open. However, when it comes to 
defining such a loaded and complex concept as expropriation, the ‘right’ 
approach is in the eyes of the beholder. This author has suggested already two 
related simple options: (i) limiting the scope of the prohibition on expropriation 
without compensation to direct or formal takings or (ii) extending the scope of 
the prohibition on uncompensated expropriation to any governmental measure 
that has the effect of completely destroying the value of the investment.38 There 
are others, of course. What is essential, however, is for policy makers (including 
the EU), first of all, to identify the underlying purpose of the international 
investment regime. From that underlying normative premise, all specific rules 
and standards (like the one on expropriation) will more easily follow suit. 
                                                        
38 Federico Ortino, Refining the Content and Role of Investment 'Rules' and 
'Standards': A New Approach to International Investment Treaty-Making, 28 ICSID 
Review 152, 160 (2013). 
